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Good฀banks฀and฀bad฀banks,฀centralised฀
banks and local banks and economic 
growth
La interminable crisis bancaria ha puesto de manifiesto la importancia de la banca para el cre-
cimiento económico. Mientras que el banco como creador de dinero es indispensable para el 
funcionamiento de la economía, el banco como prestamista de la empresa productiva es nece-
sario para la actividad económica. Un pilar del debate político internacional es la necesidad de 
una reforma estructural bancaria  que permita a los bancos desarrollar esas dos funciones más 
eficientemente. Por una parte, está la propuesta de separación de funciones entre la banca tra-
dicional (depósitos y créditos) y las de aquella otra (banca de inversión) que ha expuesto al sis-
tema mundial a un excesivo riesgo, esto es, distinguir entre una banca «buena» y otra «mala». 
A la vez, se da otro debate sobre los diferentes logros de la banca a gran escala concentrada en 
centros financieros y los de la banca a escala local o regional. 
Bankuen krisialdi amaigabeak nabarmendu du zer garrantzitsuak diren bankuak hazkunde 
ekonomikoan. Batetik, ezinbestekoa da bankuek dirua sortzea, ekonomiak funtzionatzeko, eta, 
bestetik, beharrezkoa da maileguak ematea ekoizpen-enpresei, jarduera ekonomikoari eusteko. 
Ildo horretan, nazioarteko eztabaida politikoaren ardatz bat da bankuen egitura erreformatu 
beharra, bankuek eraginkortasun handiagoaz bete ahal izan ditzaten bi funtzio horiek. Propo-
samen bat da bankuen funtzioak bereiztea: banku tradizionalak (gordailuak eta kredituak) 
eta inbertsio-bankuak bereiztea, inbertsio-bankuek gehiegizko arriskuan jarri baitute mun-
duko sistema; alegia, banku «onak» eta banku «txarrak» bereiztea. Era berean, bada beste 
eztabaida bat, finantza-zentroetan metatutako banku handien eta tokiko edo eskualdeko 
bankuen lorpenei buruzkoa. 
The on-going banking crisis has demonstrated the significance of banking for economic 
growth. While banks as creators of money are important for the functioning of the economy, 
bank lending to productive enterprises is necessary for economic activity. Much of the 
international policy discussion supports the notion of reform of banking structure to allow 
banks to perform these two functions more effectively. On the one hand there is a discussion 
of separating traditional banking functions from those which exposed the system to excessive 
risk, i.e. separating ‘good’ banking from ‘bad’ banking. At the same time there has been 
discussion of the relative merits of large-scale banking concentrated in financial centres and 
smaller-scale local banking.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
The future of banking is a critical matter for debate in Spain and in Europe 
more generally. The current fiscal crisis stemmed from the banking crisis which 
first became apparent in 2007 and which evolved into a financial crisis, a fiscal 
crisis and an economic crisis. The problems with banking were decades in the 
making (Chick, 2008) but the focus provided by the crisis gives us an unusual 
opportunity to address these problems. More important it gives us an opportunity 
to go back to first principles in order to consider what it is we want banks to do – 
what makes for a good bank? Only then do we consider below what went wrong 
and therefore what should now be done differently. This approach is a conscious 
attempt to counter the current tendency to design policy with a focus on 
minimising problems rather than considering in a constructive way the 
contribution we want banks to make to economic growth. Given the historical 
importance of a regionally-diverse banking structure in Spain, the discussion will 
focus particularly on the relative role of centralised and local banks in contributing 
to economic growth. We start the discussion at the general level before analysing 
the particular experience of Spanish banking.
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2.  BANKS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
2.1. What makes for a good bank?
The function of a traditional retail bank which contributes to economic activity 
more generally and to economic growth in particular are the provision of a safe money 
asset and the creation of credit to finance capital investment. We can characterise banks 
as being functional if they perform these functions (Studart  1995). While these two 
functions support each other, we consider each in turn. The discussion is based on 
Chick’s (1986) stages of banking development framework which sets out the logic of a 
successful process of banking development (see further Dow, 2012).
Capitalist societies could not function without money – the most safe, liquid 
asset. While money makes retail transactions logistically easier, its importance lies 
more in providing a way of denominating contracts, particularly debt and labour 
contracts. Further, it is necessary to have a safe asset to hold in times of particularly 
high uncertainty.  By far the bulk of money in modern societies (as a means of 
payment as well as a safe asset) consists of bank deposits.
The confidence in these deposits which make them suitable as money assets was 
built up over a long time. This confidence is necessary given that banks operate a 
fractional reserve system, such that there is never enough liquidity were there to be a 
bank run. Confidence was encouraged by banks handling their assets prudently. But 
individual banks may still face a liquidity problem if there was a system-wide loss of 
reserves (as with a balance of payments deficit). Central banks therefore took on the 
role of supplying banks with liquidity in such situations to prevent a crisis of 
confidence. As time went on, central banks took preventative action against crises by 
undertaking to supply liquidity as required – the lender-of-last-resort facility. In 
practice this has been the counterpart to the authorities supporting the official rate 
on the wholesale market, supplying liquidity when banks needed more. But as a quid 
pro quo for providing this facility, central banks have required retail banks to 
conform to regulations designed to ensure prudent behaviour and thus a reduced 
risk of crisis. Overall then the historical experience of retail banking was a mutual 
support relationship between the central banks and the retail banks whereby the 
latter would provide society’s money with liquidity support from the central bank in 
exchange for restrictive regulation.
It was the emergence of the habit of treating bank deposits as money which 
allowed banks to create credit, ushering in the fractional reserve system. Confidence 
in the safety of bank deposits therefore allows banks to perform their other major 
function, which is to finance productive investment. Confidence in bank deposits in 
turn was reinforced by prudent lending practices, as well as central bank 
supervision. Banks built up their expertise in risk assessment, which further 
encouraged confidence. Once the lender-of-last-resort facility was introduced, bank 
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lending was no longer constrained by reserves; banks decided first on loan 
applications then borrowed more reserves as required. As a result both the volume 
of credit and the money supply became endogenous. Central banks could not 
control credit or money, only exert influence on them.
2.2. The emergence of bad banking 
The retail banks began to chafe under the restrictions of their regulation 
compared to other types of financial institution, forgetting the privilege they 
enjoyed in being able to create credit. They successfully lobbied for deregulation 
from the 1970s to allow them to compete in a wider range of markets. Already freed 
from reserve constraints they were able to expand credit dramatically in the 1970s, 
much of it to finance speculation rather than productive investment as they fought 
over market share, and beginning to rely increasingly on wholesale funding. This 
process was accelerated in the EU by the pursuit of a single financial market in the 
name of increased efficiency (Cecchini, 1988). When the authorities tried to rein the 
ensuing credit explosion in by introducing capital adequacy requirements from the 
1980s, the banks responded by securitising debt and seeking profit opportunities in 
international derivatives markets rather than in loan contracts with their traditional 
customers. The excessive leveraging and wilful ignorance of risk led to the banking 
crisis which began in 2007 (see further Chick, 2008).
The banking system had moved a long way from the functionality expected of 
‘good’ banks. The confidence which underpins a successful banking system has been 
severely threatened; the safety of bank deposits themselves has come into question. 
The authorities’ commitment to the lender-of-last-resort facility was uncertain at 
the onset of crisis, causing bank runs. Although the liquidity was ultimately 
forthcoming, the on-going policy discussion around making banks small enough to 
fail has continued to raise questions about the safety of bank assets. The initial 
proposal for all bank deposits in Cyprus to be taxed 10% added fuel to the fire. At 
the same time the continuing fiscal crisis in the Eurozone has meant that sovereign 
debt, which conventionally is treated as a safe liquid asset for banks to hold in 
addition to reserves, is itself no longer so safe. At least however there is now public 
awareness of deposit insurance which was largely absent before the crisis.
The banks are currently focussed on repairing their balance sheets; not only 
were they holding opaque structured products of uncertain value, but they were also 
holding bad debt they had issued themselves, particularly against overvalued real 
estate. Efforts to encourage growth by monetary policy have so far been largely 
ineffective since banks are wary about resuming lending. This has hit small and 
medium-sized firms particularly hard, since large firms typically are hoarding 
money balances until investment prospects improve. While banks can expect to 
back any increased lending with borrowed reserves in the normal way, some 
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authorities have been actively feeding liquidity into their economies through 
quantitative easing programmes, further adding to the pools of idle liquidity. The 
banks are not contributing to the economic recovery.
While recovery requires fiscal stimulus, monetary policy being relatively 
powerless in a recession, the question remains what kind of banking system we want 
for the longer run. Some smaller banks in different countries have been more 
functional than others in the crisis, but will face strong competition from the big 
banks once recovery gets underway. We consider now the question of whether 
efforts should be made to support local banks in order to improve the on-going 
contribution of banking to economic growth.
2.3. Does centralisation of banking contribute to good banking?
The conventional judgement up to the 1970s was that the optimal size of banks 
was medium-sized (see e.g. Guttentag, 1976). There were technical economies of 
scale such that efficiency rose with bank size, but this advantage tailed off at 
medium size. While banks until that time were predominantly retail banks, distinct 
from investment banks, their changing character from the 1970s increased the scope 
for economies of scale such that efficiency gains peaked at a much larger size. On the 
one hand, the increasing importance of IT systems required a substantial 
investment; particular spurs were the increasing incidence of online banking and the 
increasingly complex nature of bank assets. In addition, as banks increasingly 
sought funding from wholesale markets to support their growth aspirations, large 
banks enjoyed scale advantages in the cost and availability of such funding. It 
became increasingly hard for smaller banks to compete other than in niche markets 
(including localised markets).
The 1970s deregulation experience in Europe was given a particular impetus in 
the EU with the Single Banking License, which opened up competition, not only 
between markets in different products, but also between geographical markets. The 
initial flurry of competition however settled into a process of consolidation as 
mergers and acquisitions gathered pace. The EU was optimistic that the increase in 
efficiency resulting from banking consolidation would be in the general EU interest, 
although there was an unsubstantiated expectation that small local banks would 
eventually re-emerge (Commission of the European Communities 1990).
But the regional finance literature indicates concerns that this kind of 
centralisation of banking leads to economic centralisation (see e.g. Dow, 1993 and 
Dow and Rodríguez Fuentes, 2000).1 Against the argument that large banks enjoy 
1  For further reading, see Dow (1987a, 1987b, 1992 and 1998), Faini et al. (1993), Greenwald et al. 
(1993), Samolyk (1994), Rodríguez Fuentes (1998), Rodríguez Fuentes and Dow (2003) and Usai and 
Vannini (2005). 
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economies of scale in risk assessment was set the argument that risk assessment 
remote from the local context suffers from knowledge shortfall to the detriment of 
potential borrowers. Even where large national banks have a wide branch network, 
the increasing use of credit-scoring techniques as a cost-saving measure further 
reduced the knowledge base. Just as the financial crisis arose from unrealistic 
confidence in financial markets’ capacity to measure risk, so banks moved away 
from risk assessment by judgement to risk assessment by crude calculation. Further 
these calculations reflected the expectation of continuing stability in asset prices, 
such that mortgage lending for example did not take account of the possibility of a 
housing market collapse. The large banks felt confident in their ability to securitise 
assets in order to sell on undue risks, while at the same time taking on opaque risks 
packaged together in internationally-issued structured products.
Small, local ‘good’ banks on the other hand have a comparative advantage in 
assessing local risks. But even there, such assessment is vulnerable to systemic risk 
within the economy as a whole – even if it did not arise from the practices of these 
banks. Local banks are more vulnerable than large banks given their exposure to the 
real local economy and their higher costs in accessing funding above the deposit 
base. Some ‘bad’ local banks, particularly following the kind of demutualisation 
which occurred in the UK, attempted to compete with the big banks in increasing 
short-term profits and therefore engaged in similarly high-risk increases in 
leveraging. Either way, small banks were highly vulnerable to the crisis. 
Where those banks which followed conservative strategies, maintaining 
relationships with the local community, managed to survive, they have attracted 
increased business due to the loss of confidence in the large banks. Traditionally it is 
the large banks which have been most effective in inspiring confidence, implying 
economies of scale in attracting and retaining deposits. The fact that large banks have 
survived for long periods and continued to grow inspired confidence in a self-
reinforcing way. But in addition the expectation which emerged that such banks were 
too big to fail further reinforced that confidence. The failings of the big banks and the 
apparent determination of the authorities to change the structure of banking to 
facilitate bank failure has seriously undermined this confidence. The question now is 
what structure of banking will allow banks to be ‘good’ in the sense outlined above, of 
providing a safe money asset and financing productive capital investment.
3.  THE SPANISH EXPERIENCE
Each economy’s banking system has its own character and so has responded 
differently to the competitive and regulatory forces at work over the last few decades. 
We focus now on the experience of the Spanish banking system which has been 
coloured by the way in which its regional character changed over this period. We will 
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see that this experience is particularly relevant for discussing the functionality of 
banking and the relative merits of centralised and decentralised systems.
The extraordinary expansion of financial and banking activity in Spain from the 
mid eighties was for a long time identified as one of the underlying factors in the 
intense growth and development process of the Spanish economy. Higher levels of 
financial efficiency, banking development and financial and monetary stability were 
understood to have fuelled economic growth through the intense reduction in 
financial costs, interest rates, inflation and the increase in the amount of funds 
available to lend.
The financial development of the Spanish economy was driven by the 
deregulation process initiated in the late 1970s; a process that continued through the 
1980s until its completion in the early 1990s. The liberalisation process radically 
changed the prevailing banking market structure of the 1960s and early 1970s. The so-
called «banking status quo» of that period had been characterised by the complete 
absence of competition among banks, both from an internal and external point of 
view, and a strict control both of interest rates and the allocation of the financial 
resources (credit) channeled by the banking institutions2. The first step in this gradual 
but irreversible process took place in 1974, when private banks were allowed to open 
new branches to compete with each other for deposits. The number of bank offices 
doubled between 1974 and 1984, from 15.311 to 31.876 offices respectively. But the 
expansion of bank offices continued, at a lower rate, in the 1980s and 1990s, for the 
number of offices increased by 26% between 1984 and 2004. However, the 
liberalisation in the opening of banks offices only increased competition between 
national banking institutions (private banks and savings banks), since external 
competition would not be a force until the mid nineties. The construction at that time 
of the financial counterpart of the European Single Market in the EU forced Spanish 
financial regulation3 to incorporate the principles of the Second Banking Directive.
The liberalisation of bank office opening was extended to savings banks in 1989, 
hence removing the legal and institutional restriction that had confined savings 
banks’ financial activities to their home region (or province) to preserve their «local 
character». The expansion of savings banks nationwide from 1989 had twofold 
effects. On the one hand, it allowed savings banks to increase their deposit and 
credit market shares and so catch up with private banks. On the other hand it also 
meant the starting point in the weakening of the local/regional character that had 
2  See Martín Aceña (2005), Torrero Mañas (1982) and Malo de Molina and Martín Aceña (2011) for 
further details on the historical conformation of the Spanish financial system.
3  The formal or legal opening-up of the national market to foreign banks took place in 1978, but the 
conditions imposed on foreign banks were so restrictive that they could not compete with national 
banks for the domestic retail market until the 1990s, when the principles of the European Single Market 
for Financial Services were inevitably incorporated into Spanish banking regulation.
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distinguished savings banks so far. Hence the percentage of these institutions that 
concentrated their activity in at least two regions went down from 97,4% in 1985 to 
67,4% in 20014. This was particularly true for the larger savings banks, which opted 
to expand nationwide, while medium-sized institutions mostly remained local or 
extended their activity only to the regions surrounding their market of origin.
Table 1.  SPANISH BANKING SECTOR: SOME BASIC FACTS
1985 2005 2012
Number of Institutions 364 269 258
Number of Branches 32.503 41.599 37.903
Concentration (C5) 30,1% 39,5% n/a
Private Banks 40,1% 71,1% 71,4% *
Savings Banks 31,3% 42,0% 43,3% *
Loans per Branch (thousands 
euros)
2.838 27.590 40.546 
Interest Margin 4,04% 1,29% 0,89%
* Year 2007.
Source: Maraval et al. (2009) and Bank of Spain Statistical Bulleting.
If we completely excluded from our analysis what has happened in the Spanish 
economy and financial sector from 2007 onwards, we might conclude that the fi-
nancial deregulation and liberalisation process in Spain contributed positively to 
economic growth, since it helped the achievement of higher levels of competition 
and financial efficiency within the banking system, allowing banks to supply more 
and cheaper finance. Hence, the credit-per-office ratio increased by a factor of 15 
between December 1994 and 2008, from 2,6 million euros in 1984 to 39,3 in 2008, 
and the same happened to the ratio of credit-per-employee, which increased by a 
factor of 19 during the same period (see table 1).
However, this positive assessment misses the point that financial deregulation also 
produced a strong increase in the degree of concentration within the Spanish banking 
system5, as well as an extraordinarily dense (in terms of bank offices) and costly ban-
king infrastructure (compared to other European countries). The banking expansion 
4  The percentage for those concentrated in one region went down from 90,8% in 1985 to 50,0% in 2001. 
For private banks the figures were 28,2% and 12,8%, respectively (Rodríguez Fuentes et al. 2004: 52-53).
5  When analyzing the evolution of concentration in the banking system, Maraval et al. (2009: 85-86) 
conclude that concentration decreased from early 1960s to mid 1980s, whereas from 1985 onwards this 
trend it is reverted and started to increase constantly, particularly.
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almost doubled the average number of offices per bank between 1984 and 2008, from 
86 offices to 160. The higher costs associated with a more dense bank network were 
probably offset by efficiency gains, but also by the existence of higher interest margins 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, which were four times those prevailing in 2012. But 
when margins started to go down in the nineties,6 bank profitability started to rely in-
creasingly on two factors: the success of each financial institution in permanently in-
creasing its market share, by expanding lending or exploring new products-markets, 
as well as the access to unlimited and cheaper funding resources in international mar-
kets. These two conditions did not last for ever, as the financial crisis clearly revealed 
for Spain. Hence, from 2008 there is a strong contraction in bank loans (graph 1) as 
well as a sharp decline in the funding that Spanish banks had been getting from the 
rest of the world, producing a quick deterioration in banks’ performance ratios.7
Graph 1.  BANK’ LOANS EXPANSION IN SPAIN (Index, 1998:IV  = 100)
Source: Bank of Spain Statistical Bulletin. Own calculations.
6  On average, interest margins for the deposit institution were at 4% during the period 1984-1992, then 
went down to 2% for the period 1993-2005, until they finally reached the 1%, which is proximately its 
current level (1,17% for the period 2006:3 to 2014:12).
7  According to the Financial Accounts published by the Bank of Spain, the Spanish financial institu-
tions obtained almost 5.000 million of Euros in loans from the Rest of the World between 2005 and 
2007 (approximately 1.700 million euros per year, which represented 25% of the outstanding amount of 
loans provided by the Rest of the World and 0,5% of Spanish GDP), whereas for the period 2008- 2012 
there is a negative flow of 6.000 million euros (a reduction of around 1,2 million euros per year, equiva-
lent to 30% of the stock of loans from the Rest of the world and 0,6% of Spanish GDP).
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Table 2.  BANK LOANS EXPANSION (1998-2008) AND CONTRACTION 
 (2009-2012)
total
loans
home
purchase
Agricul 
-ture
Industry Construc- tion
real  
state
Average annual rate of growth (%)
1998-2008 16,49% 18,29% 9,84% 9,27% 18,07% 33,16%
1998-2004 14,96% 18,19% 9,88% 5,75% 18,13% 35,38%
2004-2008 18,83% 18,45% 9,79% 14,78% 17,99% 29,91%
2008-2012 -3,81% -1,02% -6,21% -3,92% -14,67% -8,84%
Increase  
2004-2008 1.404.963 526.173 15.765 85.105 118.261 295.377
Increase  
2009-2012 -253.943 -22.221 -3.997 -24.478 -60.851 -102.543
8,8% 1,6% 9,6% 24,0% 40,4%
Share (%)
1998 30,9% 2,6% 15,3% 7,1% 4,6%
2004 35,8% 2,1% 10,0% 8,2% 10,6%
2012 40,4% 1,3% 8,0% 5,0% 14,1%
Source: Bank of Spain Statistical Bulletin. Own calculations.
Consequently, to some extent the financial deregulation and liberalisation process 
in Spain also contributed to the increasing vulnerability of the whole financial and 
banking system as well as to the progressive deterioration of its «functionality», for it 
pushed banks to allocate «too much» funds and loans to the development of activities 
with very limited effects on potential economic growth and global competitiveness. In 
this sense, it is remarkable that from 1998 to 2008 bank credit grew at an annual ave-
rage rate of 15%, whereas credit for real state activities grew at a rate of 35,4%. In the 
same line of reasoning, during the same period credit to the construction sector and 
households’ loans for house-purchase or rehabilitation grew at an annual rate of 18,1 
and 18,2 respectively. Almost 60% of the increase in bank loans between 2004 and 
2008 is attributed to home purchase and real estate activities loans increase. However, 
these two activities also concentrate the contraction in bank credit since 2009 (9% for 
home purchase and 40% in real state). Despite the contraction from 2009 onwards, 
the outstanding amount of bank loans for home purchase and real estate activities in 
2012 accounted for the 54% of total bank loans, and this explains a great deal in the 
deterioration of banks’ performance ratios since these two activities (construction and 
real estate) more than double the global default rate for loans (see graph 2).
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But it would be misleading to conclude, as has been asserted many times, that the 
extraordinary expansion of credit in Spain was caused by a regulatory failure which 
allowed «bad banks» to grow well beyond their limits. The credit boom was the result 
of an extraordinary low level of bank liquidity preference combined with a strong de-
mand for credit, in a context where international markets providing liquidity on very 
favourable terms. So the credit boom was not really a market failure but, as Minsky 
(1982) pointed out, the result of the market interplay between supply (the motivation 
of financial intermediaries to increase their market share) and demand (economic 
agents that asked for finance to increase activity in speculative markets). The boom in-
creased the financial vulnerability of the system, since the «continuity» of the expan-
sion of credit depended on the fulfilment of the borrowers’ expectations on inves-
tment returns and the ability of banks to keep credit expansion going. But the credit 
boom also deteriorated the functionality of the banking system, since it did not contri-
bute to improving the potential growth of the Spanish economy. 
Graph 2.  EUROSYSTEM NET LENDING TO SPAIN (in %)
Source: Bank of Spain Statistical Bulletin.
The credit boom came to its end when the international scenario changed radi-
cally in 2008, and the international financial crisis originated a «liquidity problem» 
for the Spanish banking system (due to the sudden and unexpected interruption of 
the financial inflows coming from the international markets). This problem caused 
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the functionality of the banking system to deteriorate in an even more serious way 
for the overall functioning of the economy. It raised the possibility of bank failure, 
threatening confidence in bank deposits as the main form of money. The Spanish 
banks managed to address the liquidity problem thanks to the funds provided 
through the eurosystem. During the period 1999-2007 the amount of net loans 
granted by the eurosystem to the Spanish banks accounted for the 6,7% of the funds 
provided to the whole system. Since 2008 this percentage has increased constantly 
(see Graph 2), and reached the 34% on average for the period 2011-2013 (29% for 
2010-13, and 22% for 2008-2013).
Graph 3.  SPAIN DEBT (ACCORDING TO THE EXCESSIVE DEFICIT  
 PROCEDURE)
Source: Bank of Spain Statistical Bulletin. Own calculations.
The liquidity problem was later aggravated by a «solvency problem» caused by 
the intense deterioration of economic activity in Spain and the rise in loan default 
rates, particularly in the real estate and construction sectors whose default rates rea-
ched 25,2 and 29,7%, respectively, in 2012, whereas the global default rate for loans 
was 9,1% (see Graph 4). The resulting concern over the safety of bank deposits re-
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duced the functionality of banking as the provider of society’s money, since banks 
have displayed a sort of «defensive financial behaviour» (see Dow, 1992) by redu-
cing the supply of credit for productive purposes and diverted their funds towards 
public assets from 2008 onwards (contrary to what foreign investors and other fi-
nancial institutions have been doing since then).
Graph 4.  LOAN DEFAULT RATES (%) IN SPAIN
Source: Bank of Spain Statistical Bulletin. Own calculations.
The extraordinary deterioration of Spanish banking solvency, finally, forced the 
government to intervene by conducting a complete restructuring of the sector with 
the aim of restoring its solvency and the flow of credit. But although the recession 
deteriorated bank solvency globally, it is interesting to point out that it also affected 
each group of institutions differently (Maraval et al., 2009: 241-253). Whereas the 
recession had in principle a stronger effect on savings banks’ performance, the dete-
rioration was stronger particularly within the bigger-size group of savings banks, 
which corresponds with the group that adopted a more expansionary strategy du-
ring the upturn (to emulate bigger private commercial banks). Interestingly, the pri-
vate bank group experienced just the reverse effect: the recession affected smaller 
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commercial banks more strongly. So for the Spanish case it seems difficult to extract 
a sharp conclusion on the relationship between size and banking robustness … since 
the relationship is pretty much influenced by the commercial strategy followed by 
every institution. So it might be misleading to think that further consolidation 
within the banking system will automatically lead to higher banking robustness in 
the future, for the Spanish experience shows that being big is important, but beha-
ving well (and reasonably) also matters in banking.
The restructuring process of the Spanish banking sector has been justified by the 
urgent need to get a better banking system to contribute to economic recovery. But 
the process seems to be exclusively focussed on restoring bank solvency; actually 
there has been very little discussion of which kind of financial and banking structure 
might serve best the economic restructuring and development in Spain. It seems 
that everything is being left to the expectation (or wishful thinking) that once the in-
ternational financial turmoil and the consolidation in banking in Spain is comple-
ted, the flow of credit will be restored automatically and so also the path to econo-
mic growth. However, we should question whether the reversal of the priorities 
would have better and more valuable economic and social outcomes, that is to say, 
whether we should first drive policy action to pursue the objective of functional effi-
ciency in the first place and leave the financial efficiency goal on a secondary level 
from a temporal point of view. Our recent financial experience shows that an appa-
rently sound banking system is a necessary but not sufficient condition to guarantee 
sound and sustained economic growth, since we now know that the sound Spanish 
banking of the nineties played an important role in the distortion of the Spanish 
growth model from 1995 to 2007 and to the increase in the financial fragility of the 
financial system. Our recent experience has shown that the relevant issue is not an 
«either/or» choice between efficient and functional banking, but to find out the best 
combination between both elements (efficiency and functionality) according to the 
economic and institutional circumstances.
But the fact is that, although the ongoing restructuring process has already 
changed radically the prevailing structure of the banking sector,8 it has been com-
pletely ineffective in restoring the flow of credit for economic activity. Whereas 
bank credit grew at an annual rate of 4% during 1998-2008, from 2008 it has gone 
down at an annual rate of 1% from 2008 to 2012.9 Some economists suggest that 
this credit crunch will not necessarily impede growth, since credit-less recoveries are 
not rare events at all (Bijsterbosch and Dahhaus, 2011; Abiad et al., 2011; and Cori-
celli and Roland, 2011). However, the critical issue here is to ask whether it is a fea-
8  The restructuring process has meant, so far, an important reduction in the number of institutions (30 
deposit institutions). See IMF (2013) for further details on this issue.
9  The credit contraction has been much more intense in some particular sectors, such as the construc-
tion and real estate sectors, with an annual rate of growth of -3,9 and -2,3%, respectively.
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sible assumption to expect economic recovery to take place without activating the 
flow of credit, particularly in Spain, where credit is not only the main funding sour-
ce but there is a majority of small and medium enterprises. Maybe the «credit-less 
recovery» is simply a new misleading term whose meaning needs some explanation; 
or maybe it is simply another slogan to avoid explicitly acknowledging that the poli-
cy priority is to restore banks’ solvency first (“financial efficiency”) with the expec-
tation that this will lead us to the recovery of the economy as well, but later and sub-
ject to this temporal ordering.
Another crucial missing point in the current discussion on banking restructu-
ring in Spain concerns the consequences of centralisation and increased banking 
concentration for regional growth and social cohesion. And this is an important is-
sue because current bank restructuring in Spain has meant the complete removal of 
the regional segment within the banking sector, and there is evidence supporting the 
argument that regional banks have contributed to the availability of credit in the less 
developed regions (Rodríguez Fuentes, 1997 and 1998; Romero Sánchez, 1997; and 
García Ruiz, 2007) and that spatial segmentation in financial systems does not ne-
cessarily produce inefficiency (Williams and Gardener, 2003). Obviously, some 
authors might conventionally argue that what really matters now is to have efficient 
banks and that, once such an objective is achieved, stronger financial efficiency will 
automatically guarantee the provision of credit everywhere it is needed. But this ar-
gument does not explicitly address the question of what (or how) the banking sys-
tem could (should) do to promote, not only economic growth, but also higher eco-
nomic and social cohesion; these should be the priorities for the economic policy in 
Spain considering the huge regional differences in terms of potential growth and 
unemployment rates. The conventional argument does not address the critical ques-
tion of whether higher levels of concentration and centralisation in the banking sec-
tor may exacerbate credit cycles in remoter areas,10 reinforcing the cyclical inherent 
instability of the market system.
4.  CONCLUSION
We have put the emphasis of our discussion on the two general positive roles we 
want banks to perform: providing a safe money asset and creating credit to promote 
growth.
We saw how changes in competition in European banking and the liberalisation 
of bank regulation threatened that functionality in Spain, as elsewhere. This has be-
10  During economic booms, centralisation in banking might facilitate credit and funding in remoter ar-
eas, but this can be abruptly reversed in periods of recessions, when uncertainty and high liquidity pref-
erence increases. So it might well happen that higher centralization and consolidation in banking end 
by intensifying the «pro-cyclicality» of credit in remoter economies.
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come particularly apparent as a result of the crisis. Banks faced liquidity and then 
solvency problems which were resolved by emergency central bank action which, to-
gether with increased public understanding of deposit insurance, restored confiden-
ce in banks for the time being. But, having diverted credit creation to the financial 
and housing sectors during the boom, banks remain reluctant to expand lending to 
non-financial business.
We saw that the crisis was preceded by a process of concentration in Spanish 
banking, with a particular effect of reducing the regional character of the banking 
system. But there is a substantial literature which supports the view that small regio-
nal banks are well suited to providing credit to small and medium-sized local enter-
prise. Their knowledge of the local economy and local borrowers in particular is ge-
nerally stronger than large centralised banks. The policy emphasis on bank 
efficiency as being the best indicator of capacity to promote growth therefore misses 
the important dimension of the regional distribution of credit. The more centralised 
the banking system, the weaker and more volatile the supply of credit to regions 
away from the financial sector due to the relatively weak knowledge base. Not only 
does the resulting regional distortion of economic activity damage the whole 
economy’s growth prospects, but it also threatens social cohesion. In other words it 
threatens the functionality of the banking system. The efficiency criterion should 
therefore be understood in terms of efficient functionality. This requires attention 
to the regional composition of the banking system.
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